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  *  Lord Bingham, Foreword to  R  Moules ,  Actions against Public Offi  cials:  Legitimate Expectations, 
Misstatements and Misconduct ( London ,  Sweet and Maxwell ,  2009 ) . 
  1  See, for instance, HMRC,  ‘ How to use the VAT retail Apportionment Scheme ’ (VAT Notice 727/4) 
(January 2013). On formal rulings, see above  ch 2 in text at n 18. 
  2  See together HMRC,  ‘ When you can rely on information or advice provided by HM Revenue and 
Customs ’ (March 2009) and HMRC,  ‘Admin Law Manual: ADML1300 ’ (July 2016). 
  3  Th ere is confusion on this point in the publicly available HMRC guidance cited ibid. In the  ‘Admin 
Law Manual ’ it is also mentioned that it must be demonstrated that HMRC ’ s conduct amounts to an 
abuse of power, but then (circularly) provides that an abuse of power would arise where a taxpayer can 
demonstrate fi nancial detriment. 
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 Remedies 
 But public servants are human, and it is human to err. Th ey are not immune from the 
weaknesses which affl  ict the rest of mankind. Th ey may, by words or conduct, arouse 
expectations which are later dashed * 
 I. Introduction 
 In order for the rule of law to be advanced, taxpayers to the greatest extent possible 
ought to be entitled to rely upon advice which aff ects them. Without reliability, the 
advice is essentially weightless and will fail to assist a taxpayer in understanding 
the legal consequences of her action(s). To this end, there ought to be appropriate 
mechanisms in place to ensure that the tax authority does not renege on its advice. 
Of course, formal rulings are binding on HMRC, as are instruments of general 
advice which have the force of law, such as some VAT notices. 1 But even outside of 
this context, it is the published position of HMRC that its advice can be binding, 
and so on paper that ought to be the end of the discussion. But HMRC qualifi es 
this general position in several respects. 2 First, it must be demonstrated that the 
taxpayer ’ s position falls within the scope of the advice. Secondly, there are partic-
ularities in respect of individual advice in that the taxpayer must have directed 
HMRC to all material facts and made HMRC aware of the purpose of the request 
for advice. Th irdly, there must not be a confl ict with HMRC ’ s duty to collect tax. 
Th is duty, as HMRC interprets it, means that HMRC must depart from its advice 
where there is for instance a change in the law or a change in the understanding 
of the law. It also means that the advice will not be binding where it is incor-
rect, though this is qualifi ed to the extent that a taxpayer will be protected where 
she can show fi nancial detriment would occur if the correct advice were applied. 3 
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  4  Th is book is only concerned with holding HMRC to its advice. It does not consider the conse-
quences for taxpayers in terms of distress and worry caused by HMRC for which taxpayers may be 
entitled to compensation. HMRC does provide payment for such distress: HMRC,  ‘ Complaints and 
Remedy Guidance: CRG3200 ’ (November 2018). 
  5  Th is is to be contrasted with procedural remedies, such as a right to be consulted, which can also 
be granted in the case of legitimate expectations:  R (Bhatt Murphy (a fi rm)) v Th e Independent Assessor 
[ 2008 ]  EWCA Civ 755 , [2008] All ER (D) 127 [47] – [49]. 
  6  R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Unilever plc [ 1996 ]  STC 681695 (Simon Brown LJ); 
 R (Nadarajah and Abdi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [ 2005 ]  EWCA Civ 1363 [69] 
(Laws LJ). It is probably more settled now as a result of the Supreme Court decision in  R (Gallaher 
Group Ltd) v Competition and Markets Authority [ 2018 ]  UKSC 25 , [2018] 2 WLR 1583. On which, see: 
 S  Daly and  J  Tomlinson ,  ‘Administrative Inconsistency in the Courts ’ ( 2018 )  23  Judicial Review  190 . 
Even before assessing how HMRC follows this position in practice, these quali-
fi cations alone suggest that taxpayers need to be aware of the potential remedies 
available to them where HMRC seeks to renege on its advice. 4 
 Where HMRC produces advice upon which the taxpayer seeks to rely, public 
law provides protection in the form of the doctrine of  ‘ legitimate expectations ’. 
Private law may in theory be of assistance to taxpayers, though this merits only 
brief consideration given that legitimate expectations is a much more developed 
taxpayer protection. Th ere may be a temptation of those who are legally trained to 
fetishise legal protection, but any study of taxpayer remedies would be incomplete 
without consideration of the protections aff orded outside the tribunals and courts 
system. In particular, the Adjudicator ’ s Offi  ce ( ‘Adjudicator ’ ) and Parliamentary 
and Health Service Ombudsman ( ‘ Ombudsman ’ ) can provide relief for taxpayers, 
though the jurisdiction and enforcement capability of these bodies suggest that 
their impact is necessarily limited. Th e overarching thesis in this chapter is that 
there are serious shortcomings in relation to the remedies available in terms of 
providing reliability for taxpayers. 
 Th e chapter will proceed by examining fi rst how public law can assist  taxpayers, 
assessing principally the common law doctrine of legitimate expectations though 
supplementing this discussion with consideration of its interaction with the 
European Convention on Human Rights ( ‘ ECHR ’ ) and EU law. Th e chapter will 
then briefl y consider private law remedies. Finally, the chapter will consider the 
protections aff orded outside the tribunals and courts system. 
 II. Public Law 
 Th e doctrine of legitimate expectations provides relief where a public authority 
goes back on an earlier indication that it would follow a certain course. If success-
fully invoked, it can provide a substantive remedy for a taxpayer. In other words, a 
substantive benefi t in the form of the non-payment of money to HMRC. 5 Although 
the doctrine is one which has been in constant fl ux for several decades, 6 the broad 
tenets of a successful claim for a substantive remedy under this doctrine in tax 
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  7  See  R (Davies) v HMRC; R (Gaines-Cooper) v HMRC [ 2011 ]  UKSC 47 , [2012] 1 All ER 1048 
[25] – [29] (Lord Wilson). 
  8  United Policyholders v AG of Trinidad and Tobago [ 2016 ]  UKPC 17 , [2016] 1 WLR 3383 
[38] cited approvingly in  R (Hely-Hutchinson) v HMRC [ 2017 ]  EWCA Civ 1075 , [2017] STC 2048 
( Hely-Hutchinson (CA)) [36]. 
  9  [1990] 1 WLR 1545 (CA). Th is dicta was affi  rmed in  R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Aff airs (No 2) [ 2008 ]  UKHL 61 , [2009] 1 AC 453 [60] (Lord Hoff mann). 
  10  Th roughout this chapter he will be referred to as Bingham LJ given that at issue throughout is his 
judgment in  MFK Underwriting . 
  11  Th e most recent tax case on legitimate expectations to reach the Supreme Court was that 
of  Gaines-Cooper (n 7) wherein the court based its analysis on Bingham LJ ’ s formula ([28]). 
  12  MFK Underwriting (n 9) 1569. 
  13  ibid. 
  14  ibid. 
  15  Th is aspect is added here due to the later judgment of  Unilever (n 6). 
  16  MFK Underwriting (n 9) 1569. 
  17  ibid. 
  18  Bancoult (n 9) [60];  Gaines-Cooper (n 7) [29] (Lord Wilson). 
  19  MFK Underwriting (n 9) 1569. 
  20  See  R (Tunbridge Wells BC) v Sevenoaks Magistrates ’ Court [ 2001 ]  EWHC 897 (Admin), [41] 
(Sullivan J). 
  21  See:  Bancoult (n 9) [60] (Lord Hoff mann);  Gaines-Cooper (n 7) [29] (Lord Wilson). 
cases are relatively set. Th e fi rst is that there must exist a  ‘ legitimate expectation ’ 7 
and the second is that frustrating this expectation would be unlawful, 8 though 
these two limbs are not mutually exclusive. 
 On the fi rst limb, the initial pronouncement of the law in this area came in 
the case of  R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte MFK Underwriting ( ‘ MFK 
Underwriting ’ ). 9 Th erein Bingham LJ (as he then was) 10 set out two conditions 
necessary for an expectation to be legitimate in tax, from which there has been 
little subsequent divergence. 11 Th e fi rst is that the taxpayer placed all her cards 
face upwards on the table. 12 Th is condition is applicable only where an individual 
taxpayer has sought out a ruling from HMRC. 13 In such an instance, she must 
give full details of the specifi c transaction on which she seeks the ruling and she 
must indicate the purpose of the ruling sought, in other words, that she seeks to 
rely upon it. 14 Th e second condition is that the taxpayer received a promise, repre-
sentation or assurance, or there was an established practice, 15 which was clear, 
unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualifi cation. 16 Although a  ‘ literal reading ’ 
of Bingham LJ ’ s judgment might suggest this condition would not apply to 
communications directed at taxpayers generally, 17 it has later come to be accepted 
that it does. 18 In the case, he remarked that a statement formally published by 
HMRC to the world  ‘ might safely be regarded as binding,  subject to its terms , in 
any case falling clearly within them ’ (emphasis added). 19 Logically, however, a case 
would fall clearly within the scope of a publication  only if the terms were clear and 
 unambiguous. 20 Similarly,  ‘ its terms ’ would need to be unqualifi ed as a condition 
precedent to creating an expectation upon which there could be any reliance. 21 
 Th e second limb of the doctrine is that frustrating the expectation must 
be unlawful and the onus shift s to the public authority to demonstrate that it 
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  22  Paponette  & Ors v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (Trinidad and Tobago) [ 2010 ]  UKPC 
32 , [2012] 1 AC 1 [37] (Dyson SCJ). On which, see:  R (on the application of) v General Medical Council 
[ 2013 ]  EWCA Civ 327 , [2013] 1 WLR 2801 [58] and  In the matter of an application by Geraldine 
Finucane for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2019] UKSC 7 [64] (Lord Kerr). 
  23  R v North and East Devon Health Authority (ex p Coughlan) [ 2001 ]  QB 213 (CA) , [2000] 3 All ER 
850 [57] (Lord Woolf);  In Re Preston [ 1985 ]  1 AC 835, 864H , [1985] STC 282 (HL) (Lord Templeman). 
  24  Unilever (n 6) 695 (Simon Brown LJ). 
  25  Gallaher (n 6). 
  26  Which has a certain circularity as there is no common consensus on the categorisation of the 
grounds for review; see  M  Elliott and  R  Th omas ,  Public Law ,  3rd edn ( Oxford ,  Oxford University 
Press ,  2017 )  497 . See  CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service [ 1985 ]  AC 374 for the famous tripartite 
categorisation. 
  27  See  Gallaher (n 6), in particular [41]. In the High Court in  R (Hely-Hutchinson) v HMRC [ 2015 ] 
 EWHC 3261 (Admin), [2016] STC 962 ( Hely-Hutchinson (HC)), the taxpayer succeeded essentially 
on the ground that there were relevant considerations which were not taken into account. Th at case 
was overturned in the Court of Appeal ( Hely-Hutchinson (CA) (n 8)) and in any event preceded the 
Supreme Court judgment in  Gallaher . 
  28  See:  Coughlan (n 23) [57] (Lord Woolf). 
  29  Unilever (n 6) 697 (Simon Brown LJ). 
  30  ibid;  R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Unilever plc [ 1994 ]  STC 841, 849 (Macpherson J). 
  31  For instance,  Unilever (n 6). 
  32  R (Cameron) v HMRC [ 2012 ]  EWHC 1174 (Admin), [2012] STC 1691 (Wyn Williams J) [70] – [71]. 
See also:  R (Bamber) v HMRC [ 2005 ]  EWHC 3221 (Admin), [2006] STC 1035 [59] (Lindsay J). 
is acting lawfully. 22 As this limb of the doctrine developed this was sometimes 
 understood as an action on the part of a public authority which is so unfair as 
to amount to an  ‘ abuse of power ’, 23 or  ‘ conspicuously unfair ’. 24 But claims for 
legitimate expectations should no longer be couched in such language. Following 
the decision in  R (Gallaher Group Ltd) v Competition and Markets Authority 
( ‘ Gallaher ’ ) , 25 it is clear that the doctrine of legitimate expectations is not a 
 sui generis ground of review, but rather that an unlawful action in respect of a legiti-
mate expectation must be grounded in the accepted grounds for judicial review. 26 
Generally, this will require HMRC to demonstrate that refusing to give eff ect to the 
legitimate expectation is not  unreasonable . 27 In the context of legitimate expecta-
tion tax cases, this essentially invites a balancing exercise between, on the one 
hand, detriment to the private interest of the individual in frustrating an expecta-
tion as against the detriment to the public interest, on the other hand, in giving 
eff ect to it. 28 Mere unfairness as such, which could be characterised as  ‘ a bit rich ’ 
but nevertheless understandable, will not suffi  ce. 29 It is necessary that the deci-
sion by HMRC to renege on its earlier communication is so  unreasonable that it 
should not be permitted to stand. 30 An example of such unreasonableness would 
be HMRC reneging on an earlier agreement with immediate eff ect. 31 Giving the 
taxpayer a reasonable transitional period in which to rearrange her aff airs, on the 
other hand, would not. 32 
 Interestingly it is not necessary that the commitment on which the claim 
for legitimate expectation is grounded is actually communicated to the aff ected 
party. Th e orthodox case where the doctrine will assist a taxpayer is where she has 
received information from HMRC on which she then acts. However, the doctrine 
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  33  Gallaher (n 6) [29] (Lord Carnwath);  Bancoult (n 9) [182] (Lord Mance). Th e fact that the doctrine 
protects various interests is well explained in  R  Williams ,  ‘ Th e Multiple Doctrines of Legitimate 
Expectations ’ ( 2016 )  132  LQR  639 . 
  34  See  R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [ 2001 ]  EWCA Civ 607 , [2002] 1 WLR 237 
(Schiemann LJ) [29];  R v Department of Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie [ 1999 ]  EWCA 
Civ 2100 [48] (Gibson LJ);  Bancoult (n 9) [60] (Lord Hoff mann). For a tax case where this arises, see 
 R (Aozora) v HMRC [ 2017 ]  EWHC 2881 (Admin), [2018] STC 11 [98] (Sir Kenneth Parker). Th e 
courts ’ focus on detriment overlooks the possibility of developing the doctrine on the basis of what 
David Owens calls  ‘ authority interest ’. Th e basic idea is that once a promise has been given, the control 
over that promise shift s to the promisee and so the promisee should control whether the promise is not 
given eff ect. Th e virtue of this position is that  ‘ human beings oft en want such authority for its own sake 
(not just to facilitate prediction or coordination) ’. See:  D  Owens ,  ‘A Simple Th eory of Promising ’ ( 2006 ) 
 115  Philosophical Review  51 . 
  35  Th is was noted by Whipple J in  Hely-Hutchinson (HC) (n 27) [64] and accepted by the Court of 
Appeal:  Hely-Hutchinson (CA) (n 8) [92]. 
  36  See:  Tunbridge Wells BC (n 20) [41] (Sullivan J). 
  37  Bhatt Murphy (n 5) [46]. 
  38  See  R v IRC, ex p Matrix Securities Ltd [ 1994 ]  1 WLR 334 . 
also imposes a requirement on public bodies to act consistently across persons, 
unless there is a good reason not to. 33 Of course, when it comes to the balancing 
act between private and public interests in terms of assessing the  reasonableness of 
reneging on the earlier commitment, the person will have a stronger claim where 
she acted in reliance on the advice. Th e claim will be stronger again where she 
has relied on the advice to her detriment. 34 It is for this reason that above it was 
noted that HMRC ’ s position does not properly refl ect the correct legal position on 
when advice can be binding. To recall, HMRC ’ s position is that it must collect tax 
where the advice is incorrect unless it can be demonstrated that there is fi nancial 
detriment. But the correct legal position is less strict  – yes, fi nancial detriment  can 
demonstrate unreasonableness on the part of HMRC and it will be in exceptional 
circumstances where its absence is not fatal for substantive legitimate expectations 
claims, but it is not the  only way to demonstrate unlawful conduct. 35 
 Th e two limbs to the doctrine are not mutually exclusive, but are interrelated. 
For instance, the clarity of a representation will have a bearing upon whether 
resiling from it would be unreasonable. 36 By this standard, bespoke advice to an 
individual taxpayer is likely to be much more targeted than general advice, thus by 
its nature making it more likely to be unreasonable to resile from it. 37 On the other 
hand, if a taxpayer were to have concealed material information in the request for 
a ruling, HMRC would not be acting improperly in refusing to give eff ect to it. 38 
 A. Inaptness of the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations 
 Having set out the initial framework within which legitimate expectation claims 
are assessed, it is now possible to move on to the overarching argument of this 
section, namely that the doctrine of legitimate expectations provides insuffi  cient 
protection for taxpayers seeking to rely upon HMRC advice. Th ere are fi ve key 
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  39  R (on the application of Lower Mill Estate Ltd and Conservation Builders) v Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners [ 2008 ]  EWHC 2409 (Admin), [2008] BTC 5743 [22] (Blake J). It is left  open here 
whether there is such a thing as  the right answer in tax as to how much tax is due by talking only of a 
mistake leading to  an answer which is incorrect. 
  40  See  ch 3  section II B i . 
  41  Th e doctrine of ultra vires is one of the cornerstones of the UK ’ s constitutional framework and in 
broad terms forms the basis for judicial intervention. See  Boddington v British Transport Police [ 1998 ] 
 UKHL 13 ; [1999] 2 AC 143, 171 (Lord Steyn);  R v Hull University Visitor, ex parte Page [ 1993 ]  AC 
682 (HL), 701 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). For prerogative powers and non-statutory bodies, see for 
instance,  R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafi n [ 1987 ]  QB 815 (CA). 
  42  See on this point, the case of  Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [ 1992 ]  2 AC 1 (HL). 
  43  Attorney-General v Wilts United Dairies Ltd ( 1921 )  39 TLR 781 (CA). 
  44  [2004] ScotCS 112, [2004] STC 1703 (IH). 
  45  See  ch 3 in text at n 74. 
  46  By this I mean to include both those provisions which impose or relieve taxes, and those provisions 
which impose obligations on either HMRC or the taxpayer as to the procedure to be followed in order 
to comply with the substantive provisions. 
problems for taxpayers, which broadly map on to issues of correctness, clarity and 
accessibility under assessment in earlier chapters. Th e fi rst two relate to satisfying 
the second limb, binding HMRC even in the case of incorrect advice ( ‘ Correctness ’ ) 
and relatedly, negating HMRC ’ s desire to maintain control ( ‘ Control ’ ). Th e second 
two relate to satisfying the fi rst limb of a successful claim, namely demonstrating 
suffi  cient clarity on the part of HMRC ( ‘ Clarity ’ ) and not being caught by a quali-
fi cation ( ‘ Qualifi cations ’ ). Finally, there is the issue of access to justice ( ‘Access ’ ). 
 i. Correctness 
 Th ough the doctrine of legitimate expectations generally performs an important 
function in holding public authorities to their representations or practices, a cynic 
might note that it is at its most useful in tax where, but for a representation of 
HMRC, monies would otherwise have been due. 39 But that begs a critical question 
concerning HMRC ’ s duties  – how can it be within HMRC ’ s powers to uphold an 
expectation that it will not collect tax which it has a duty to collect ? Th e answer 
is that it is within HMRC ’ s powers to uphold an expectation even if this means 
collecting less tax than is due. 40 But in order to explain the answer in this particular 
context it is necessary to start by noting that a public authority must act lawfully, 
including by acting within its powers ( intra vires ). 41 HMRC would accordingly be 
acting ultra vires if it sought to sell fi nancial products, 42 or to levy taxes. 43 Given 
that the duty is to collect tax, this requires at a minimum that HMRC not act 
directly contrary by explicitly agreeing not to investigate or challenge a  taxpayer ’ s 
future aff airs in return for a fi xed sum of money, as occurred in  Al-Fayed 
v Advocate General for Scotland (CIR) . 44 But it has already been established that it 
is within HMRC ’ s powers to provide assistance to taxpayers in the form of advice, 45 
and this is so even if the advice is incorrect in the sense of misunderstanding 
a taxing provision (procedural or substantive) 46 or its application to the facts. 
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  47  In an earlier article, I was more hesitant to suggest this  – but even if this proposition is incorrect, 
an alternate argument on the basis of common law constitutionalism can produce the same result. See 
 S  Daly ,  ‘ Recent developments in tax:  vires revisited ’ [ 2016 ]  2  Public Law  190 . Th e argument would go 
as follows: incorrect advice may be unlawful. But it is also unlawful for HMRC to act contrary to the 
principle of good administration. Th us, the role of the court in such an instance would be to balance the 
two unlawful actions against each other. Th is latter argument ought to be credited to Rebecca Williams 
with whom the author had invaluable discussions when writing the aforementioned article. See also: 
 P  Craig ,  ‘ Representations by Public Bodies ’ ( 1977 )  93  LQR  398, 413 – 17 . 
  48  P  Craig ,  Administrative Law ,  8th edn ( London ,  Sweet and Maxwell ,  2016 )  700 . Th ough Craig 
was speaking in the context of ultra vires expectations, the argument still applies as in the situation 
discussed here the issue is whether there ought to be an expanded category of actions which should 
count as ultra vires. 
  49  See  Rowland v Environment Agency [ 2003 ]  EWCA Civ 1885 , [2005] Ch 1 [103] (May LJ);  Stretch 
v West Dorset DC ( 1999 )  77 P  & CR 342 , [1998] 3 EGLR 62 (CA) 66 – 67 (Peter Gibson LJ). 
  50  See  MFK Underwriting (n 9) 1567C and 1568F. See also  Gaines-Cooper (n 7) [26] (Lord Wilson). 
  51  L  Beighton ,  ‘ Th e Finance Bill process: scope for reform ? ’ [ 1995 ]  British Tax Review  33, 41 . 
  52  See in HMRC,  ‘ Extra-Statutory Concessions: Concessions as at 6 April 2018 ’ (April 2018). See 
also ESC B41 in that list and HMRC,  ‘ What happens if we ’ ve paid you too much tax credits (COP 26) ’ 
(April 2019). 
  53  [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] AC 868. 
Were it otherwise, there would be undesirable consequences that it must be 
assumed were not intended by Parliament. 47 For instance, it would result in injus-
tice for taxpayers who sincerely placed reliance upon HMRC ’ s advice. 48 It would 
also be impractical, for HMRC would be held to be acting beyond its powers every 
time it makes a mistake, which itself would produce the perverse incentive to delay 
or avoid decisions indefi nitely for fear of making mistakes. Or indeed, conversely, 
the incentive might be to be cavalier, knowing that any mistakes can later be 
corrected. 49 To this end, Bingham LJ in  MFK Underwriting rightly rejected as too 
narrow the notion that any mistake on the part of the tax authority resulting in less 
tax collected would be in confl ict with the statutory duty. 50 Indeed, despite what 
counsel may have argued in the case, Leonard Beighton, the Director-General of 
the Inland Revenue, recognised that the Revenue could be bound by assurances 
 ‘ however unsound the rulings might have been ’. 51 Moreover, HMRC ’ s practice is 
to let past mistakes lie, thereby accepting that mistakes are within its powers. For 
instance, by way of ESC A19 taxpayers can ask HMRC not to seek taxes due if it 
has made a mistake because it did not act on information provided. 52 
 One could seek to invoke the Bill of Rights Act 1688/9, Article  1 of which 
provides that the suspension of laws without consent of Parliament is illegal, 
whilst Article 4 proscribes the levying of taxes without Parliamentary approval. 
Th us HMRC mistakes which either result in more or less tax than is due could be 
constitutionally problematic, though in response it should be countered that, for 
the reasons already listed, Parliament ’ s will is not undermined as it can be taken to 
have intended that mistakes are within the powers it granted HMRC. 
 Further, it does not undermine the rule of law rationale for providing advice 
if the advice is itself occasionally wrong. In a parallel context, Lord Reed noted in 
 AXA General Insurance Ltd v Lord Advocate 53 that  ‘ the protection of the rule of law 
does not require that every allegation of unlawful conduct by a public authority 
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  54  ibid [170]. 
  55  See  ch 4 in text at n 8. 
  56  Hely-Hutchinson (HC) (n 27) [43] (Whipple J). 
  57  On mistakes see for instance  Gallaher (n 6) [62] (Lord Briggs);  R (O ’ Brien) v Independent Assessor 
[ 2007 ]  2 AC 312 (HL) [30] (Lord Bingham);  Customs and Excise Comrs v National Westminster Bank 
plc [ 2003 ]  EWHC 1822 (Ch), [2003] STC 1072 [66] (Jacob J). 
  58  MFK Underwriting (n 9) 1569;  R (Greenwich Property Ltd) v Commissioners of Customs and 
Excise [ 2001 ]  EWHC 230 (Admin);  Lower Mill Estate (n 39) [13] (Collins J);  Gaines-Cooper (n 7) [28] 
(Lord Wilson). 
  59  Samarkand Film Partnership No. 3  & Ors v Revenue And Customs [ 2017 ]  EWCA Civ 77 , [2017] 
STC 926 (Samarkand (CA)) [115]. 
  60  Hely-Hutchinson (CA) (n 8). Part of this discussion is extracted from a longer case note that the 
author has written:  S  Daly ,  ‘ Legitimate expectations and HMRC advice ’ ( 2018 )  77  Cambridge Law 
Journal  265 . For another example where a mistake was critical, see:  R (Veolia and Viridor) v HMRC 
[ 2016 ]  EWHC 1880 (Admin), [2016] STI 2201. 
  61  Inland Revenue,  ‘ Technical Note ’ (January 2003). 
  62  HMRC,  ‘ HMRC Brief 30/09: Shares acquired before 10 April 2003 by exercising employee share 
options  – allowable deductions ’ (July 2019). 
must be examined by a court ’. 54 What is important, it is submitted, is that on the 
whole taxpayers are better advised as to the legal consequences of their actions 
because HMRC provides advice. Moreover, the designation of advice as incorrect 
in such a context is far from straightforward  – does it take the Supreme Court 
determining it to be incorrect or would it suffi  ce simply if there was a legal opinion 
to that eff ect ? Further, whilst incorrect advice does not help individuals understand 
the  true legal consequences of their actions, it does help individuals understand 
the de facto consequences of their actions. In terms of planning their lives then, 
human dignity, the value which underpins the thin account of the rule of law, is 
off ended by removing this foreseeability about the consequences of actions. But it 
should go without saying that HMRC of course should still strive to ensure that 
the advice is correct. 55 
 However, whilst the presence of a mistake does not render the advice unlawful , 
it will nevertheless prove problematic for taxpayers as it aff ords HMRC a strong 
argument (though not a  ‘ trump card ’ ) 56 that it has a  ‘ good reason ’ to frustrate the 
expectation  – namely that Parliament has prescribed that more tax is due  – hence 
shielding HMRC from an accusation of irrationality. 57 To this end, it is oft en 
remarked by the courts that a taxpayer ’ s prima facie legitimate expectation is to be 
taxed in accordance with the law. 58 Th ere is a strong public interest in the imposi-
tion of taxation in accordance with the law. 59 It is for this reason that HMRC will 
be held to be acting lawfully where it retrospectively changes its advice where a 
mistake has been made. 
 For instance, in the case of  Hely-Hutchinson v HMRC 60 the Court of Appeal 
held that the fact that the guidance which the taxpayer sought to rely on contained 
an error inter alia justifi ed HMRC ’ s decision not to honour its previous advice. In 
2003, the Inland Revenue issued guidance in respect of the calculation of capital 
gains tax on sales of share options. 61 In 2009, HMRC acknowledged that the guid-
ance contained an error of law and produced revised guidance. 62 As regards closed 
cases where the 2003 guidance was relied upon, HMRC has applied the terms of 
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  72  Hely-Hutchinson (CA) (n 8) [92]. 
the 2003 guidance. Where the case was open in 2009, as in the case of the taxpayer 
Ralph Hely-Hutchinson, HMRC applied the less favourable 2009 guidance. Th e 
Court of Appeal found that HMRC ’ s decision to do so was lawful, critically noting 
that HMRC had  ‘ good reason ’ to depart from it. 63 Th is was because it contained 
a mistake, but the Court did little to elaborate upon the circumstances in which a 
mistake can be said to have arisen. What about the case where it is highly unclear 
whether HMRC has previously made a mistake ? What counts as a mistake  – does 
internal legal advice pointing out a possible mistake suffi  ce ? What if a  tribunal or 
other judge fi nds against an HMRC interpretation ? 64 Perhaps the lack of  reasoning 
is explained by the fact that HMRC ’ s error was particularly obvious and hence 
it went without having to be said that in such an obvious case HMRC could 
reverse its position. But that explanation is diffi  cult to square with the Court ’ s 
statement earlier in the judgment that it was  ‘ not concerned with the correctness 
of HMRC ’ s view ’. 65 
 In any event, it is clear that in many cases HMRC will be found to have acted 
lawfully by frustrating a legitimate expectation if the underlying advice contained 
a mistake. Taxpayers can be more confi dent in cases where they can demonstrate 
detrimental reliance, as courts are generally comfortable with holding it to be 
unlawful in such circumstances to frustrate the expectation. 66 Th e taxpayer needs 
to be able to show something akin to positive causation 67  – for example, where a 
taxpayer builds student accommodation thinking it will be entitled to relief, 68 or 
sells a family home and moves abroad 69 or, in the case of a seafarer, sets off  from 
anchorage before midnight. 70 Th e detriment of simply having to pay the tax that 
is due will not suffi  ce alone  – recalling that a taxpayer ’ s prima facie expectation 
is to be taxed in accordance with the law 71  – nor will the detriment caused by 
events external to the reliance on the advice. 72 
126 Remedies
  73  Whipple J upheld the taxpayer ’ s complaint in the High Court in  Hely-Hutchinson on the basis 
that HMRC should also take into account the comparative unfairness of treating taxpayers with open 
cases diff erently from persons whose cases are closed ( Hely-Hutchinson (HC) (n 27) [71]). Although 
the decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal, the Court did not reject Whipple J ’ s decision that 
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  74  See  Hely-Hutchinson (CA) (n 8) [53] and [62]. 
  75  See  Hely-Hutchinson (CA) (n 8) [64]. 
  76  Gaines-Cooper (n 7). 
 Further, taxpayers may also succeed if they can show comparative unfairness 
because a similarly placed taxpayer has received diff erent treatment, though we 
have yet to see a successful tax case to date where this argument by a taxpayer has 
succeeded. 73 Th e problem lies in fi nding a comparator in a  ‘ materially  identical ’ 74 
position, rather than simply fi nding another taxpayer who has been treated 
diff erently. In  Hely-Hutchinson , the taxpayer argued that the relevant comparator 
was people who submitted their tax returns in reliance on the 2003 guidance, but 
the Court of Appeal held that the relevant comparator group was those taxpayers 
whose returns were still open when the 2009 guidance was introduced. 75 And the 
taxpayer was treated the same as those in the latter category, though not those in 
the former category. 
 Perhaps in the future, the Court may also accept the rule of law rationale 
advanced in this book, or at least the human dignity aspect underpinning the 
principle, as an important factor in determining whether it would be unlawful 
to resile from incorrect advice. But as it currently stands, beyond exceptional 
circumstances where detrimental reliance or comparative unfairness or something 
akin to either can be demonstrated, the orthodox position that one cannot rely 
upon incorrect advice holds. Th e taxpayer accordingly is severely hindered by an 
inability to rely upon advice which contains incorrect information. Th e taxpayer is 
also hindered, at a broader level, by the uncertainty as to whether HMRC should 
discover a mistake at a later date and rescind the previous treatment. 
 ii. Control 
 A bolder proposition is that the doctrine of legitimate expectations is hampered 
by HMRC ’ s desire to maintain control over use of its advice, so as to counteract 
unforeseen advantages being gained by taxpayers. Th e desire to maintain control 
most likely stems from discomfort with the idea that HMRC is to blame for 
reduced revenues for the exchequer. Several arguments are advanced in support 
of this contention, drawing upon the prevalence of  ‘ qualifi cations ’ and HMRC ’ s 
approach to changes of interpretation. In the fi rst instance, the assertion is borne 
out by the very insertion of  ‘ qualifi cations ’ such as health warnings and provisos. 
In  R (Davies) v HMRC; R (Gaines-Cooper) v HMRC ( Gaines-Cooper ), 76 HMRC 
argued successfully that the insertion of the  ‘ health warning ’ encouraging contact 
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with HMRC in any case of diffi  culty in applying the relevant guidance, prevented 
HMRC from being bound  ab initio. 77 Given that this judgment was handed down 
in 2011, the continued use of health warnings indicates that the purpose is to 
reserve to HMRC control over the use of its published advice. By extension, the 
inclusion of provisos precluding reliance in a case of  ‘ tax avoidance ’ similarly seeks 
to endow broad discretion upon HMRC. HMRC uses the word  ‘ avoidance ’ to 
mean bending the rules of the tax system to gain a tax advantage that Parliament 
never intended, 78 but this is not a defi nition from the case law, and nor is it a statu-
tory defi nition of tax avoidance. 79 By using its own broader defi nition, HMRC can 
take a wide approach as to what it might defi ne as  ‘ avoidance ’, giving the body the 
opportunity to counteract use of its advice by the taxpayer which it dislikes. Th e 
explicit insertion is crucial, as noted by Collins J in  R (Greenwich Property Ltd) 
v Commissioners of Customs and Excise ( ‘ Greenwich Property ’ ) 80 as such a proviso 
must be expressed and cannot merely be implied into communicated material. 81 
 Secondly, the approach to changes in legal advice reinforces the contention that 
HMRC seeks to reserve discretion to counteract benefi ts perceived to be undue, 
given that it is not forced to do so. HMRC ’ s position in such an instance is that 
it is generally bound to follow the new legal interpretation. 82 Carnwath J (as he 
then was) in  R v Customs and Excise Commissioners, ex parte F  & I Services Ltd 83 
noted that a  ‘ bona fi de change of legal opinion within the commissioners  might be 
expected ’ (emphasis added) to preclude the previous advice from being binding 
prospectively. 84 But HMRC may also seek to apply the new legal interpretation 
retrospectively, as occurred in the case of  Hely-Hutchinson , where the new inter-
pretation applied to all who had previously sought to rely on the 2003 guidance 
and whose cases were still open in 2009. In neither case, particularly in the latter, 
is it an  obligation for HMRC to do so. Of course, it is under a duty to collect taxes 
and there is a strong public interest in collecting taxes which are due. But a change 
of legal opinion does not prove that taxes are due, no more than an unfavourable 
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non-fi nal tribunal or court decision proves that taxes are not due, and vice versa. 
HMRC has the power to make mistakes and when it realises a potential mistake, its 
 obligation is to consider its options. 85 It may be lawful to renege on prior commit-
ments as in  Hely-Hutchinson , but it may be lawful also to take other approaches. 86 
 iii. Clarity 
 A legitimate expectation can only arise on the basis of HMRC advice which is of 
suffi  cient clarity. Th e manner in which this condition has been interpreted 87 opens 
it up to two alternate criticisms, however: that fulfi lling the condition is exceed-
ingly diffi  cult; and/or that the requirements for its satisfaction are so malleable as 
to deprive HMRC advice of its normative, rule of law utility. 88 Both points can be 
best illustrated by examining the successful legitimate expectation cases, there-
aft er contrasting them with unsuccessful cases wherein conditions were implied 
into the advice. Th is detailed analysis of the case law also will serve the practi-
cal purpose of assisting taxpayers who are engaged in disputes with HMRC as to 
whether they can rely on HMRC advice. 89 
 In  R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Unilever plc , 90 the ques-
tion was whether HMRC could resile from its previous conduct, wherein over 
the course of 20 years it had accepted tax relief claims from taxpayers outside 
the statutorily prescribed period. 91 Th e Court of Appeal held that HMRC acted 
unlawfully by resiling from this trend, enforcing the time bar and denying the 
taxpayers claims for relief. Th e conduct on the part of HMRC had given rise to an 
unequivocal expectation that relief claims would be accepted beyond the statu-
tory time period. 92 Th e case of  R (Cameron) v HMRC ( ‘ Cameron ’ ) 93 concerned 
two seafarers who successfully contended that they were entitled to the seafarer ’ s 
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deduction from their earnings because they had relied upon guidance. Th e  ‘ eligi-
ble period ’ for seafarer ’ s deduction was calculated by reference to days of absence 
from the UK, 94 which in turn pivoted upon whether a person was absent the UK 
at midnight. 95 However, determining whether a seafarer was in or outside the UK, 
defi ned by a 12-mile radius, at midnight would be incredibly diffi  cult and onerous 
to prove. To this end, a concession was issued in guidance published to seafarers 
whereby if the boat upon which the seafarer was present left  its berth or anchor-
age prior to midnight, the seafarer would be taken to have left  the UK. 96 HMRC 
contended that this concession would only apply where the ship was destined for 
another country. 97 Th e taxpayers ’ understanding was that this concession would 
apply regardless of whether the ship was ultimately destined for another country, 
but would be satisfi ed simply if it left  the UK. 98 Th e guidance upon which they 
sought to rely read as follows: 
 A day of absence from the UK is any day when you are outside the UK at the end of 
that day (midnight). We normally treat a vessel as having left  the UK at the moment it 
leaves berth or anchorage, on a voyage which will take it outside UK territorial waters. 
Arrival times are treated in a similar way. 99 
 Wyn Williams J found that this wording unequivocally provided that, once outside 
at midnight, the seafarer would be treated as being absent the UK. 100 It is diffi  cult, 
from a reading of the text, to arrive at any other conclusion, and HMRC did not 
press this point. HMRC ’ s case, in reality, pivoted upon whether this  ‘ concession ’ 
was superseded by a subsequent, narrower concession. 101 In  Greenwich Property , 102 
the University of Greenwich had decided to create a new student residence. Half 
had been completed with the University ’ s own funds, with the other half funded 
through a Private Finance Initiative (PFI). Th e PFI agreement prescribed that the 
accommodation would be let privately during the summer months. Th e applicant 
sought to rely upon a published concession 103 from HMRC to the eff ect that the 
building would be zero-rated, 104 notwithstanding the fact that students would not 
be the sole inhabitants of the residential accommodation. Th is published conces-
sion read as follows: 
 Higher education institutions are in a peculiar position as they know that some use is 
likely to be made of student accommodation for non-qualifying purposes during vaca-
tions but such use is diffi  cult to quantify. In the circumstances, because in any event tax 
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  111  Biff a Waste (n 71). 
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will be collected in respect of this non-qualifying vacation use and provided that the 
new building is clearly intended primarily for use as student accommodation for 
ten years from the date of its completion, then we are content for higher education 
institutions to disregard the 10% de minimis rule and to issue a certifi cate for the 
construction or acquisition of such a building as  ‘ relevant residential ’ building under 
Group 8 of the zero-rated schedule. 
 Th e thrust of the concession was that HMRC would treat the building as zero-rated 
if the University could demonstrate its primary use for ten years would be student 
accommodation. 105 HMRC contended that to fall properly within the terms of 
the concession, it was necessary for the University itself to rent out the property 
during the summer months and not the PFI provider. 106 Collins J rejected this on 
the basis that there could be no logical distinction between such an activity being 
undertaken by the University itself or a third party, and that both instances fell 
squarely within the terms of the concession. 107 Th erein, however, Collins J high-
lighted the signifi cant height of the threshold facing an applicant in a legitimate 
expectation claim. Th e taxable person must demonstrate that she has acted strictly 
in accordance with what the concession permits and has complied with all the 
conditions necessary to obtain the relief. 108 Th ere can be  no ambiguity: 
 Any doubt should be resolved in favour of the tax being payable according to the statu-
tory provision since, if there is doubt, or the language of the concession is ambiguous, 
the taxpayer should inquire of the Commissioners whether what he intends to do falls 
within the concession. 109 
 Collins J allowed the concession to be relied upon given that there was no doubt 
as to the applicability of its terms in this case. Th ere was no mention in the conces-
sion as to whether it was necessary or not for the University itself to rent out the 
accommodation in the summer months. As with  Cameron , HMRC did not push 
the point. Rather, HMRC ’ s overarching claim was that the concession was being 
utilised as a tool for tax avoidance. 110 Th is too was the case with  R (Biff a Waste) 
v Revenue and Customs 111 where the main issue of the proceedings was not the 
clarity of the ruling which was given to the taxpayer, but whether that ruling 
applied only to the specifi c facts on which it was given or whether it could 
be applied to analogous situations (which the Administrative Court accepted 
it could). 112 
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 R v Customs and Excise Commissioners, ex parte Kay , 113 meanwhile concerned 
the recovery of overpaid VAT by opticians. HMRC had made representations in a 
Business Brief 114 to the relevant taxpayers which stated that they were entitled to 
repayment of overpaid VAT: 
 Any claims for repayment with statutory interest which date back to 1 September 1988 
should now be submitted by opticians to their local VAT offi  ce, together with details of 
the apportionment used, where that is still to be agreed with the local offi  ce. 
 It was subsequently identifi ed in the brief that any such claims should be made 
before 12 March 2001. 115 Th e Court held that this amounted to a clear represen-
tation upon which the taxpayers were entitled to rely. 116 As with  Cameron and 
 Greenwich Property , HMRC ’ s contention that it was not bound by an expecta-
tion did not revolve around the terms of the publication, but on this occasion was 
based upon an understanding that legislation would later be introduced retrospec-
tively to counter the repayment duties and as such ought not to be bound by the 
publication. 117 
 In these cases, the advice contained assurances that the judges accepted as clear 
and to an extent it could be argued that HMRC too accepted this, given that it oft en 
had to explore fallback arguments separate from the issue of clarity. Th ese cases are 
very much the exception to the rule: most cases will not overcome the  ‘ no ambi-
guity ’ bar. Th is can be demonstrated by looking at cases wherein HMRC and the 
courts interpreted conditions or provisions  into the relevant advice that were not 
apparent on fi rst reading. In  Gaines-Cooper , 118 the need for a  ‘ distinct break ’ was 
read into HMRC ’ s published material. Th e taxpayers claimed that HMRC guidance 
gave rise to a legitimate expectation that non-resident status would be acquired if 
the residence day count were satisfi ed (ie less than six months in any year were 
spent in the UK). 119 HMRC, on the other hand, contended that the taxpayers addi-
tionally needed to demonstrate a  ‘ distinct break ’ with the UK. 120 Th e majority of 
the Supreme Court (Lord Mance dissenting) agreed with HMRC, notwithstanding 
that the guidance itself made no explicit reference to the concept. 121 Lord Wilson 
gave the leading speech and is seen in this following paragraph to interpolate such 
a meaning into the words of the guidance: 
 [Th e] paragraphs [in the Guidance] must be read compendiously.  Th ey shared one 
important feature: they all referred to  ‘ visits ’ on the part of the individual to the UK . If he 
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usually resides in the UK, he will go abroad as a visitor but, if he has left  the UK and 
has adopted a usual residence abroad, he will come to the UK as a visitor:  we are not 
visitors in the country of our usual residence . Th e reference to visits to the UK therefore 
underlined the need for a change in the individual ’ s usual residence and  therefore, by 
ready inference, for a distinct break in the pattern of his life in the UK. 122 
 Freedman and Vella described the majority ’ s approach to the construction of 
HMRC ’ s guidance in this case as  ‘ questionable ’, 123 as regards its departure from the 
plain language of the text. Th e forced reasoning of Lord Wilson in the extracted 
piece supports this conclusion. It requires a linguistic double leap: fi rst, to imply 
that the reference to visits brings to mind the idea that one cannot be a visitor in 
the country of one ’ s usual residence and secondly, to imply that this,  ‘ by ready 
inference ’, requires a  ‘ distinct break ’ from the UK. 
 Similar  ‘ reading in ’ was initially successful in the case of  Ingenious Media , 
which arose out of an episode where David Hartnett (then Permanent Secretary 
for tax at HMRC) disclosed the details of the investigation of particular taxpayers 
to journalists from  Th e Times . 124 Th e taxpayers claimed that the exposure breached 
a legitimate expectation created by an HMRC Manual. 125 Th e relevant publication 
indicated that HMRC could disclose customer information for the purpose of an 
HMRC function, with examples provided such as: 
•  passing HMRC debt details to the Offi  cial Receiver in bankruptcy work; 
•  providing the police with details of a forthcoming visit so they can assess the 
health and safety risk (see IDG40460); 
•  making inquiries about a HMRC customer with a third party (see IDG30400); 
•  carrying out distraint in a public place. 126 
 Being a non-exhaustive list, the Manual thereaft er stressed that disclosure of infor-
mation would be proper if this enabled HMRC to carry out its functions more 
eff ectively. 127 An  ejusdem generis reading of the above examples, however, is highly 
unlikely to direct the reader to permit the disclosure of case-specifi c details to the 
media as occurred in that case. An example of a disclosure of the same order might 
be sharing taxpayer information with the media in order that journalistic inves-
tigations would not undermine a police raid, 128 which is a far cry from imparting 
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it generally to journalists because it may result in more effi  cient tax collection. 
Th e High Court and Court of Appeal nevertheless upheld HMRC ’ s action as 
being in line with the Manual on the basis that it would bolster both relations 
between the media and HMRC and, in turn, the effi  cient collection of tax. 129 With 
a harmonious relationship would come a quid pro quo: the media would hand 
over evidence of tax avoidance to HMRC and the engagement would additionally 
ameliorate public confi dence in the administration of the tax system. 130 Th at such 
disclosure is viewed as being of the same order as that of use for distraint and debt 
collection demonstrates the breadth of interpretation which the courts can poten-
tially apply to HMRC advice. Of course, the Supreme Court ultimately held that 
HMRC ’ s disclosure was unlawful, 131 but made no comment on HMRC ’ s Manual, 
or whether the taxpayers could expect on the basis of information in the Manual 
that HMRC would not disclose information (though it can probably be inferred 
that the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts on the issue). 
 In  R (ELS Group) v HMRC 132 an issue before the Court of Appeal was whether 
HMRC guidance could apply retrospectively. Th e relevant guidance, Business Brief 
BB4/10, contained a concession which limited the quantum of VAT a business had 
to charge when seconding its own staff . Th e court was required to construe the 
guidance in order to determine whether its terms were capable of being applied 
retrospectively (ie whether the taxpayer was entitled to rely at a later time upon 
the guidance, having failed at the relevant time to elect for the treatment under 
the guidance). HMRC contended that  ‘ concessions should be given a relatively 
narrow construction in recognition of the fact that they involve a derogation from 
statute ’. 133 Th is was accepted by Patten LJ, to whom it seemed  ‘ that the most infl u-
ential contextual element in the process of construction must be the statutory 
default position ’. 134 As the guidance itself did not in clear words state that it could 
be applied retrospectively, the taxpayer could not be said to be entitled to the 
concessionary treatment. Th e fact that the concession operated: 
 [I]n eff ect as a decision by HMRC not to collect tax that becomes statutorily due  … 
militates strongly in my view against giving the concessions any greater scope than a fair 
and normal reading of the language of the concession dictates. 135 
 Moreover, to extend the concession retrospectively to fi t the current case would 
 ‘ create an obvious inconsistency ’ with the relevant legislation  ‘ and is a powerful 
reason why the concession should be assumed and interpreted not to have that 
eff ect ’. 136 In brief then, the Court placed signifi cant reliance upon the proper legal 
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position in order to determine the meaning and scope of the HMRC advice, even 
if this correct legal position was not actually mentioned in the advice itself. 
 On the one hand, it might be said that the successful cases demonstrate just 
how clear the advice must have been in order for the taxpayer to prevail in a legiti-
mate expectation claim. But on the other hand, the cited unsuccessful cases might 
demonstrate an altogether diff erent proposition  – namely, that what is important is 
not the content of the advice itself, but the interpretation and interpretative meth-
odology of the deciding judge. Th e argument that the advice should be understood 
in light of implied material is always open to HMRC. 137 
 iv. Qualifi cations 
 In order to ground a legitimate expectation, the HMRC advice must be  ‘ devoid 
of relevant qualifi cation ’. Th e sheer ubiquity of qualifi cations in general advice, 
rather than in individual advice, undermines this potential. For instance, many 
publications contain  ‘ health warnings ’ in the form of:  ‘ Th is Publication gives you 
information about X, and how HMRC interprets the legislation in the context of 
applying X to an individual ’ s circumstances ’. 138 
 Th ere is a clear trend of courts being inclined to fi nd that such health warn-
ings undermine the prospect of a legitimate expectation from arising. In the case 
of  Hanover Company Services Ltd v HMRC , 139 the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) noted 
obiter that such a health warning  precluded the creation of a legitimate expecta-
tion, though that puts the point too strongly. 140 Collins J in  Th ompson v Fletcher 141 
more accurately summarised the problem as being that a  ‘ health warning ’ can 
serve to vitiate the possibility of an expectation arising, as it makes it  ‘ absolutely 
clear that readers should not be [ sic ] assume that the guidance is comprehensive ’. 142 
Th e issue of health warnings also came to bear in  Gaines-Cooper . Th e majority of 
the Supreme Court held that the claim to a legitimate expectation could not be 
made out, partly because of the presence of a health warning. 143 Th e guidance 
upon which the applicants sought to rely was prefaced as follows: 
 Th e notes in this booklet refl ect the law and practice at October 1999. Th ey are not 
binding in law and do not aff ect rights of appeal about your own tax. You should bear 
in mind that the booklet off ers general guidance on how the rules apply, but whether 
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the guidance is appropriate in a particular case will depend on all the facts of that case. 
 If you have any diffi  culty in applying the rules in your own case, you should consult an 
Inland Revenue Tax Offi  ce . 144 
 Provisos to HMRC materials can provide much the same eff ect. Th ese are found, 
for instance, attached to HMRC ’ s published list of ESCs which provides that 
concessions will not be given in any case where an attempt is made to use them 
for tax avoidance. 145 Th is proviso resulted in an ESC not applying to a taxpayer 
in the case of  R v Inspector of Taxes, ex parte Fulford-Dobson 146 as the court held 
that the taxpayer was attempting to use the concession for avoidance purposes. 147 
In dismissing the taxpayer ’ s contention that a legitimate expectation arose on the 
basis of representations in an HMRC Manual, the Upper Tribunal in  Samarkand 148 
placed signifi cant weight on a caveat precluding reliance where  ‘ there is, or may 
be, avoidance of tax ’. 149 It followed that the taxpayers had to take the Manual in 
its entirety and could not  ‘ take out the plums they liked and ignore the duff  they 
did not ’. 150 Th e Court of Appeal noted that the guidance was  ‘ permeated with 
qualifi cations relating to tax avoidance ’ 151 and agreed with the Upper Tribunal ’ s 
reasoning on the point. 152 
 v. Access 
 Access to the tribunals and courts is also an obstacle to the protection of taxpayers 
from HMRC reneging on written representations. Access is circumscribed by the 
requirement that a claim based on legitimate expectations be brought in the High 
Court rather than the FTT, 153 costs and the scope for judicial review applications. 
 For a time, there was considerable uncertainty as to the scope of the tribunal ’ s 
power to hear issues of public law. 154 In  Oxfam v HMRC , 155 Sales J (as he then 
was) embarked on an analysis of analogous case law relating to the jurisdiction 
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of similar tribunals and also the relevant statutory wording, before concluding 
that the FTT had jurisdiction to hear public law matters. However, this judgment 
has been later refi ned as only relating to the determination of input tax for the 
purposes of section 83(c) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994. 156 Th e result now is 
that a taxpayer will have to commence judicial review proceedings in the High 
Court, as well as pursue the substantive case in the tax tribunal. 157 Th is resulting 
duplication has been criticised by John Avery Jones: 158 
 I do not see this as a matter of principle. Th e High Court certainly has power to review 
all exercises of discretions by Customs for those who can aff ord to go there; why should 
not the Tribunal if they are qualifi ed to decide the more diffi  cult substantive part of the 
appeal ? 159 
 It is certainly questionable why an expert tribunal cannot determine all the issues 
surrounding a case which comes before it. 160 One could counter that it is necessary 
to ensure that public law issues are dealt with at a higher level due to the fact that 
the FTT is not constituted wholly by judges. 161 However, there is a certain air 
of  ‘ fi g leaf  ’ 162 logic to the argument, considering that in the case of some taxing 
 provisions, the tribunal does in eff ect decide upon public law issues. For instance, 
the tribunal will take account of excess of jurisdiction, unlawfulness or impro-
priety on the part of HMRC when evaluating the reasonableness of a taxpayer ’ s 
excuse for avoiding a penalty. 163 Indeed, as the author has pointed out the tribunal 
considers issues in respect of all the grounds of judicial review thereby underlining 
its competence to hear public law claims. 164 
 Th e practical ramifi cations of having to commence judicial review in the High 
Court were highlighted in  William Bourne v HMRC . 165 For the ordinary taxpayer, 
without the benefi t of representation, the requirement to commence dual proceed-
ings is  ‘ tantamount, in practice, to denying that appellant the ability to pursue 
that claim ’. 166 Th e unrepresented taxpayer is unlikely to go to the expense of fund-
ing two sets of proceedings, 167 and may be unaware of the relevant procedure, 
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namely that the taxpayer must institute judicial review proceedings within 90 days 
of HMRC ’ s decision, 168 and should simultaneously stay these proceedings behind 
the substantive appeal. 169 
 In practical terms, cost is perhaps the greatest obstacle to a taxpayer seeking to 
advance a legitimate expectation claim. Proceedings must be commenced in the 
High Court (Administrative Court). 170 Th e cost of commencing judicial review 
proceedings (now  £ 154), of requesting a reconsideration a judicial review appli-
cation at a hearing ( £ 385) 171 and of pursuing the claim if permission is granted 
(now  £ 770) 172 is prohibitive generally and will almost completely deter persons 
with disputes worth under  £ 1,000. Th e Court has discretion also to award costs 
against an unsuccessful judicial review applicant. 173 Where the Court decides to 
make an order, the general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to 
pay the costs of the successful party. 174 Litigants may apply to the Court to have 
their judicial review case heard by the Upper Tribunal, 175 but the Court must be 
satisfi ed that transferring the case would be  ‘ just and convenient ’. 176 In any event, 
costs can also be awarded against the losing party 177 and the same costs-shift ing 
rule which operates in the High Court probably also applies given that the Upper 
Tribunal in such an instance is exercising concurrent jurisdiction. 178 Th e extent 
to which some Court fees can be avoided meanwhile depends upon when, in the 
litigation, the case is transferred to the Upper Tribunal. On the other hand, there 
is currently no fee for taking a case to the First-tier Tax Tribunal and each side 
generally bears its own costs. 179 
 Finally, section 84 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 has the eff ect 
of introducing another barrier to access for claimants. Th is provides that the High 
Court must refuse to grant relief on an application for judicial review if it appears 
to the Court to be  highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not 
have been substantially diff erent if the conduct complained of had not occurred 
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(although the Court retains a discretion to grant relief for reasons of exceptional 
public interest). 180 Th e same applies to the permission stage, although this only 
arises where the defendant brings the motion, or where the Court decides this of 
its own motion, that the outcome would have been substantially the same. 181 It is 
the words  ‘ highly likely ’ which are at issue. Previously judges had a discretion to 
refuse relief where the same outcome would have been  ‘ inevitable ’, a much higher 
standard. 182 Th e amendment was signifi cantly criticised, most notably by Lord 
Pannick, whose  Times article on the issue 183 became a focal point for the debate as 
the bill passed through the houses. 184 
 It could be argued that although this amendment is undesirable from the 
perspective of reducing the scope for holding public authorities to account in respect 
of unlawful actions, 185 the private rights of claimants are unaff ected. In other words, 
if the claimant can demonstrate a right to a remedy which is more than nominal, 
the case will still proceed and, to this end, the amendment should not hinder access 
to the courts for taxpayers seeking to hold HMRC to its advice (given that taxpayers 
claims ’ should generally be for non-nominal remedies). Th is, however, is to over-
look the obfuscating nature of the amendment. Judicial review targets generally the 
propriety of the decision-making process, and only exceptionally, for instance where 
unreasonableness is demonstrated, the decision itself. By reducing the standard to 
 ‘ highly likely ’ from  ‘ inevitable ’, the judge is forced to consider in outline the merits 
of the decision and to place herself in the shoes of the decision-maker, hypothesis-
ing whether it was highly likely that she too would arrive at the same decision. 186 
By introducing this possibility, it increases the scope for the judge to decide that the 
claimant ’ s action should be dismissed. Th e consequence of the change is to make it 
more diffi  cult for a claimant to bring an action and to seek relief. 
 B. Using the ECHR and EU Law 
 In order to be comprehensive, it should be mentioned that as a matter of public 
law, there are additional options that can be pursued by taxpayers in order to seek 
Public Law 139
  187  Th is aligns with what might be at least the anecdotal observation that litigants are better advised 
to ground arguments generally in established administrative and constitutional law principles. In 
this context, Dinah Rose has said that  ‘ [Blackstone ’ s commentaries get] much more purchase with 
a common law judge in many occasions than the human rights act ’. See  ‘ Magna Carta: Myth and 
Meaning ’ discussion from 19.28, available at:  www.intelligencesquared.com/events/magna- carta-myth-
and-meaning . For instance, see  R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor [ 2017 ]  UKSC 51 , [2018] 1 CMLR 35, 
where the constitutional principle of access to justice arrived at the same result as EU law ([66] – [85] 
and [89] in particular (Lord Reed)). 
  188  Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v Germany (42527/98) [ 2001 ]  ECHR 463 , para 83. 
  189  See  R (on the application of Carvill) v IRC [ 2003 ]  STC 1539 (QBD) [49]. 
  190  On which, see  Bulves AD v Bulgaria  (3991/03) [ 2009] STC  1193 ;  Aleena Electronics Ltd v HMRC 
[ 2011 ]  UKFTT 608 (TC) [38] – [44]. 
  191  It may even be contested in the First-tier Tribunal rather than the High Court, as was tried in 
 Aleena Electronics Ltd v HMRC [ 2011 ]  UKFTT 608 (TC). 
  192  For a helpful recent overview of what amounts to a possession in the context of tax, see:  R (on 
the Application of Rowe and Others) v HMRC; R (on the Application of Vital Nut Co Ltd and Others) 
v HMRC [ 2017 ]  EWCA Civ 2105 , [2017] WLR(D) 830 [158] – [185] (McCombe LJ). 
to enforce legitimate expectation claims against HMRC. Most notably, taxpayers 
can seek to invoke the ECHR and EU law. However, it should be made clear that an 
argument which fails on the common law legitimate expectation claim will most 
likely derive little benefi t from these routes. 187 
 Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR protects the  ‘ peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions ’, within which a claim for a substantive legitimate expectation can be 
made. However, Article 1 Protocol 1(2) is deferential towards signatory states in 
respect of tax. It provides that deprivation of possessions may be justifi ed  ‘ in the 
public interest ’, as provided by law. In particular, states are entitled  ‘ to control the 
use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment 
of taxes or other contributions or penalties ’. Th ere are, accordingly, signifi cant 
hurdles for a taxpayer seeking to invoke the ECHR in order to advance a legitimate 
expectation claim in respect of HMRC advice  – the fi rst is demonstrating that she 
comes within the scope of the provision by holding a  ‘ possession ’ ; the second is 
fi nding the infringement not to be justifi ed; and the third is that, even if justifi ed, 
she must demonstrate that any such justifi cation is not proportionate. 
 A legitimate expectation claim must be incidental to a property right in order 
for it to garner the protection of the First Protocol. 188 Th us, if a property right is 
present, 189 for instance such as a right to recover input tax, 190 a claim to a legiti-
mate expectation can be considered. 191 But the problem lies in demonstrating that 
a suffi  ciently strong claim in law is present so as to amount to a  ‘ possession ’. 192 
Demonstrating such a strong claim only brings us back to the question of whether 
a legitimate expectation is made out as a matter of national law, thereby essentially 
adding nothing to the common law protection. However, assuming that one can be 
made out, the ECHR will generally not assist beyond what the common law legiti-
mate expectation doctrine can provide. Th is is because HMRC will be justifi ed in 
reneging on a legitimate expectation if it does so in order to secure the payment 
of tax and will have little diffi  culty in an ordinary case demonstrating the action 
to be proportionate given that national authorities are aff orded  ‘ a wide margin 
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of appreciation ’, 193 particularly in tax cases. 194 Cases that have succeeded on the 
proportionality ground have involved an interference  ‘ so burdensome, arbitrary, 
unfair or excessive, relative to any community or public interest, as to preclude 
its being regarded as reasonably founded ’. 195 Take, for instance, the case of 
 R.Sz v Hungary. 196 Th ere the taxpayer was among a group of persons singled out 
for additional taxation, some time aft er the original receipt of the monies, leading 
to almost total deprivation of the money received. 
 Th e principle of legitimate expectation in EU law, 197 meanwhile, can assist 
taxpayers where the claim concerns EU law, for instance because the relevant 
HMRC advice relates to VAT or the Directive on Administrative Cooperation. 198 
Th e EU doctrine of legitimate expectations protects an individual in a situation in 
which a relevant public body gives precise, unconditional and consistent informa-
tion, in whatever form, thereby leading that individual to entertain well-founded 
expectations. 199 Th is defi nition does not appear to provide anything of substance 
to diff erentiate it from the common law doctrine. 200 
 However, beyond that provided by common law, the EU doctrine may be of 
assistance to taxpayers as it potentially provides greater reliability for expectations 
predicated on incorrect advice, though this depends on the particular error. In 
 Elmeka NE v Ypourgos Oikonomikon , 201 the taxpayer received an assurance from 
the Greek tax authority that its supply of services was exempt from VAT, though 
this was incorrect. Th e Court of Justice noted that the doctrine of legitimate expec-
tations formed part of the EU legal order. 202 Th e taxpayer ’ s expectation would be 
binding on the Greek Government, subject to the national court determining 
whether the taxpayer could reasonably have believed that the public authority 
which provided the incorrect advice was competent to rule on the application of 
the exemption to its activities. 203 Th e question of competence here was particular 
to the facts as the Greek Government argued that the organ of the tax authority 
which provided the advice was not the correct department to which requests for 
advice were to be directed. 
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 Th e judgment of the Court should be read alongside the Advocate General ’ s 
opinion in the case, which elaborates upon the narrow circumstances which led to 
this outcome. 204 She noted that the same result would not be arrived at where the 
underlying error related to community law which is unambiguous. 205 Nor where 
the community law in question, which has been misconceived in the advice, is 
that of  ‘ general interest ’ in the sense that Member States have no natural vested 
interest in the correct application of the Community rules concerned. 206 State aid, 
for instance, is an example where the rules only work if all Member States act 
scrupulously in implementing them, whereas there is a perceived economic incen-
tive conversely for Member States not to apply them in individual instances. Th e 
integrity of the Schengen area provides another example of a general interest situ-
ation where deviations have an impact across Member States rather than being 
internal to a single state. 207 Th is case, however, concerned VAT, and more particu-
larly, it concerned a trader who believed its supplies to be exempt. Had these not 
been exempt, the trader would simply have passed on the charge to the consumer 
(subject to price elasticity). In sum then, beyond the protection provided by the 
common law doctrine of legitimate expectations to taxpayers seeking to hold 
HMRC to its advice, the ECHR can only provide assistance in extreme circum-
stances. Meanwhile, EU law will be helpful only in situations where HMRC advises 
in relation to EU law in which it is competent, 208 the relevant law is not unambigu-
ous and honouring the incorrect advice does not have an impact on the scope or 
eff ectiveness of EU law. 209 
 Finally, it should be noted that the ECHR and EU law may assist in respect of 
retrospective changes in advice where this is done because of a change in the law. 
As noted in respect of the ECHR, 210 the rule of law requires that laws be foresee-
able and accessible, with respect to which retrospective changes in law necessarily 
confl ict. 211 EU law similarly guards against retrospective changes as these confl ict 
with the principle of legal certainty. 212 A detailed discussion of these options, 
however, is outside the scope of this book as, in both instances, the taxpayer will 
in reality have to attack the change in law rather than HMRC ’ s change of position 
in light of the law. 
142 Remedies
  213  Others would include negligent misstatement, but only very specifi c circumstances would assist 
for this cause of action, as the taxpayer would need to demonstrate a  ‘ special relationship ’. On this, see 
 Hedley Byrne  & Co Ltd v Heller  & Partners Ltd [ 1964 ]  AC 465 (HL), [1963] 2 All ER 575. See more 
generally,  G  Weeks ,  Soft  Law and Public Authorities:  Remedies and Reform ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing , 
 2016 )  chs 9 and  10 . 
  214  Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd v Twitchings [ 1976 ]  1 QB 225 (CA), 241 (Denning MR). 
  215  A  Bradley ,  K  Ewing and  C  Knight ,  Constitutional  & Administrative Law ,  17th edn ( Harlow ,  Pearson 
Education ,  2018 )  667 . 
  216  [2002] UKHL 8, [2002] 4 All ER 58. 
  217  ibid [35]. 
  218  For instance  Fisher v Brooker [ 2009 ]  UKHL 41 , [2009] WLR 1764 [63] (Lord Neuberger). For a 
strong exploration of this issue see:  E  Cooke ,  Th e Modern Law of Estoppel ( Oxford ,  Oxford University 
Press ,  2000 )  ch 6 . 
  219  Reprotech (n 216) [34]. 
  220  Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries and Food v Matthews [ 1950 ]  1 KB 148, 153 (Cassels J);  Vestry 
of the parish of St. Mary, Islington v Hornsey Urban District Council [ 1900 ]  1 Ch 695 , (CA) 704 – 705; 
Craig,  Administrative Law (2016) 705. 
  221  Reprotech (n 216) [35]. 
 III. Private Law 
 For the sake of completeness, it should be noted there are remedies in private 
law which in theory could assist a taxpayer in holding HMRC to its advice, but 
these are underdeveloped for this purpose. Th e most notable is estoppel. 213 Th is 
provides broadly that a party, including for our purposes a public authority, can 
be estopped from resiling from an earlier commitment to another party because 
it would be unjust or inequitable to do so. 214 However, this is much narrower and 
less developed than the legitimate expectations doctrine. Indeed, as Bradley, Ewing 
and Knight have noted, it is  ‘ not likely to be of any utility in the near future ’. 215 
Th e oft -cited statement from Lord Hoff mann in  R v East Sussex County Council, 
ex parte Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd 216 in particular drives such pessimism. Although 
the private law concept of estoppel was helpful in the development of the doctrine 
of legitimate expectations, its reserves for that purpose have been exhausted: 
 It seems to me that in this area, public law has already absorbed whatever is useful from 
the moral values which underlie the private law concept of estoppel and the time has 
come for it to stand upon its own two feet. 217 
 Th ere are several key limitations to the use of estoppel for present purposes which 
demonstrate that its scope is far narrower than the doctrine of legitimate expecta-
tions. First, the claimant must show generally show detriment, 218 whereas as noted 
already this is not the case with legitimate expectations. Th is is because public law 
forces the relevant public authority to take into account a broader range of factors, 
such as the interests of the general public, when exercising its powers. 219 Second, 
estoppel cannot be allowed where it would require a public body to act outside 
its powers, 220 and even more problematically cannot be used to estop a public 
authority from exercising a statutory discretion or performing a public duty. 221 
Th is will prove fatal for a taxpayer where HMRC argues that more tax is due than 
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had earlier been communicated, as HMRC in such an instance is simply carrying 
out the statutory function of collecting taxes. 222 
 IV. Non-court Remedies 
 If there were a triangle representing legal disputes, it would only be those at the apex 
of the wedge which actually make it to litigation. Many more disputes are settled 
at a much earlier stage. Where a dispute arises in relation to reliance on HMRC 
advice, taxpayers should fi rst seek to resolve the issue with HMRC directly. 223 
HMRC will have another look at the decision and if the taxpayer is still unhappy 
with the outcome, then a diff erent offi  cial independent of the original decision-
maker will review the complaint and give a fi nal response. 224 Th is  ‘ second look ’ 
is known as internal review and has proved to be not unfavourable for taxpayers, 
with 49 per cent of reviews in 2013/14, for instance, resulting in HMRC ’ s decision 
being cancelled or varied. 225 
 If a taxpayer is still unhappy, she may approach the Adjudicator and if still 
unhappy can be referred by her local MP to the Ombudsman. Th e Adjudicator and 
Ombudsman may recommend a range of remedies. 226 Th e Adjudicator may recom-
mend ex gratia payments, recompense and other payments to complainants such 
as covering expenses incurred in pursuing complaints and compensation for loss 
of time in pursuing complaints. HMRC generally agrees to implement recommen-
dations, other than in exceptional circumstances or where the recommendation 
would require HMRC to depart its published standards, guidance and codes of 
practice. 227 Th e Ombudsman has broader jurisdiction and may recommend a wide 
range of remedies, from the issuance of an apology 228 to fi nancial compensation, 229 
144 Remedies
  230  Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman,  ‘ Equitable Life: a decade of regulatory failure ’ 
(HC 2007 – 08, 815-I) 377. 
  231  See  ch 5 in text at nn 137, 152 and 119. 
  232  On the utility of the Ombudsman see also Weeks,  Soft  Law (2016) ch 12, who arrives at a similar 
conclusion. 
  233  See Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, s 5(2), though there is an exception where the 
Commissioner believes it to not be reasonable to expect the citizen to pursue proceedings in a court or 
tribunal. Adjudicator, HMRC and VOA,  ‘ Service Level Agreement ’ (n 227) para 5.12 provides that the 
Adjudicator cannot look at issues that the courts could have considered or could consider. 
  234  [2008] EWCA Civ 36, [2009] QB 114. 
  235  See  ch 5 in text at n 152. 
  236  Bradley (n 234) [51], [72] (Sir John Chadwick). 
  237  ibid [95] (Sir John Chadwick). 
  238  See, for instance, Adjudicator ’ s Offi  ce,  ‘Annual Report 2012: A year of challenges ’ (July 2012) 13. 
See Adjudicator, HMRC and VOA,  ‘ Service Level Agreement ’ (n 227) paras 5.1, 5.2 and 5.20 on the 
scope of the Adjudicator ’ s remit to that end. 
  239  See HMRC,  ‘ Complain about HMRC ’. 
  240  Adjudicator ’ s Offi  ce,  ‘Annual Report 2012 ’ (n 238) 17. 
which seek to restore the complainant to the position she would have been in had 
the maladministration not occurred. 230 Th ough as noted already 231 neither body 
is vested with formal powers to bind HMRC to its recommendations, a review of 
case studies from the Adjudicator and Ombudsman reveals that they can be eff ec-
tive in holding HMRC to its advice. 232 Th is is despite the fact that neither body is 
in theory supposed to investigate complaints where a legal remedy, such as a claim 
based on legitimate expectations, is available. 233 Moreover, the case of  R (Bradley) 
v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 234 adds some legal force to recommen-
dations from the Ombudsman and Adjudicator. 235 HMRC should only reject the 
fi ndings of either body if there are  ‘ cogent reasons ’ 236 for doing so and the courts 
may quash the rejection if it is deemed to be irrational. 237 
 A. Th e Adjudicator 
 Th e Adjudicator is more constrained in the remedies that can be issued than the 
Ombudsman and regularly repeats that the Offi  ce has  ‘ no jurisdiction to ask HMRC 
to act outside of their guidance or instructions ’. 238 But this does not prevent the 
Adjudicator from holding HMRC to its advice, or at least compensating taxpayers, 
even where the advice is incorrect. Th is is because HMRC may have a practice or 
policy of following incorrect advice. For instance, HMRC guidance provides that 
persons may be entitled to compensation for reasonable costs directly caused by 
their mistakes or delays. 239 Th us in a case study from the Annual Report 2012, a 
company complained that HMRC ’ s National Advice Service had given misleading 
advice. 240 Initially HMRC did not accept it had made any errors for which redress 
should be considered. Th e Adjudicator asked for a further independent review 
to be undertaken. In addition, she asked one of her investigators to obtain and 
listen to recordings of the two telephone calls made to the NAS. Having reviewed 
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this evidence, the Adjudicator found that a mistake had been made by HMRC 
and recommended that the body pay the costs arising from the misleading advice. 
HMRC agreed and, as an aside, also issued an apology for its poor complaints 
handling. Moreover, HMRC does have a policy of following its incorrect advice 
(as has already been set out) provided that the taxpayer can satisfy HMRC ’ s strict 
tests, which notably includes demonstrating fi nancial detriment. Where HMRC 
provided an assurance to taxpayers who traded in a partnership that their supply 
of tuition services was VAT exempt and later tried to go back on the advice (on 
the basis that in fact a third party provided the tuition on behalf of the partners), 
the Adjudicator upheld the complaint on the basis that the taxpayers would suff er 
detriment if held to the correct legal position. 241 
 A case study from the Annual Report 2010 serves to bear out, meanwhile, that 
the Adjudicator is capable of holding HMRC to its general advice, regardless of 
whether the taxpayer has sought to rely on it (much as the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations also ensures consistency of administrative action). HMRC gave up 
tax otherwise payable in respect of Mr F, whose diffi  culties began when he retired 
and took a part-time job in 2003. 242 His PAYE personal allowances were duplicated 
for both sources of income. In November 2006, Mr F received tax calculations 
for 2004 – 05 and 2005 – 06, showing signifi cant amounts of tax owing. Mr F then 
instructed an accountant who wrote to HMRC, but HMRC took a long time to give 
a detailed reply. Th e Adjudicator recommended that HMRC should not pursue the 
underpayments of tax as it was not reasonable to assume that Mr F should have 
been able to work out that he had not been paying enough tax, particularly as he 
had not received any tax codes for those years. Th is money was payable as a matter 
of law, but the Adjudicator was relying upon HMRC guidance (ESC A19). 
 Th ese examples serve to demonstrate that the Adjudicator is a useful option 
for taxpayers. However, its utility from the perspective of holding HMRC to its 
advice should not be overstated. First, its remit is restricted and in the examples 
above the Adjudicator should not in fact have considered the issues given that a 
remedy in the courts on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectations would 
have been available. More problematically, the remedies that are available are  ‘ soft  ’ 
rather than  ‘ hard ’ in the sense that should HMRC disagree with the Adjudicator ’ s 
recommendation then it would be necessary to go to court to seek its enforcement. 
 B. Ombudsman 
 Th e reports of the Ombudsman are also replete with examples of the body holding 
HMRC to its advice. Th e  ‘Annual report for 1990 ’ provides two such examples. 243 
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HMRC ’ s practice on reimbursing taxpayers for expenses arising by reason of 
offi  cial error on the part of the department is set out in general HMRC advice. 244 
In one case, the Ombudsman found that a solicitor ’ s costs fell squarely within the 
terms of the concession and the department agreed to reimburse the expense. 
In another case, the Ombudsman found that a taxpayer fell within the terms of a 
concession relating to sick pay (the now obsolete ESC A26), 245 but the department 
had overlooked to apply it in the case at hand. It was agreed that the complainant 
should be endowed with an ex gratia payment totalling  £ 96. 
 Th e Inland Revenue ’ s refusal to apply another concession, namely ESC A19, 
which forgives tax where there are delays on HMRC ’ s part, to cases which fell 
within its terms came in for much criticism in the  ‘Annual report for 1991 ’. 246 Th e 
Ombudsman ’ s opposing opinion that the taxpayers concerned did actually fall 
properly within the terms of ESC A19 was suffi  cient to provoke the Inland Revenue 
to give the taxpayers the benefi t of the concession. 247 In one case, the Revenue had 
initially refused to apply the concession because a separate governmental depart-
ment, the Department of Social Security (DSS), 248 caused the delay. Th e DSS had 
acquiesced in its duty to pass information concerning the state pension to the 
Inland Revenue. Aft er the Ombudsman ’ s intervention, the Inland Revenue agreed 
to compensate the taxpayer to the tune of  £ 598.14. In a similar case, the taxpayer 
had been aware that the DSS had this arrangement with the Inland Revenue 
and accordingly relied upon this mechanism, rather than informing the Inland 
Revenue himself of his state pension. Th e Ombudsman recommended that the 
taxpayer obtain the benefi t of the concession for the delay caused, again by the 
DSS ’ s tardiness in passing on information. He received an exceptional ex gratia 
payment of  £ 975. 
 Given that the remit of the Ombudsman ’ s jurisdiction is to investigate 
complaints of  maladministration causing injustice , the Ombudsman may recom-
mend that an individual be compensated to produce an eff ect equivalent to an 
incorrect, more favourable tax assessment to which the taxpayer thought she 
was entitled. 249 To this end, where HMRC provides advice to a taxpayer which is 
incorrect as a matter of law, the Ombudsman may recommend that the taxpayer 
be compensated to in eff ect put that taxpayer in the position as if the incorrect 
position continued to apply. In one case, for instance, a taxpayer was compen-
sated for failure on the part of a Customs and Excise offi  cer to advise him of a 
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more  ‘ tax effi  cient ’ way of structuring the refurbishment of his house. 250 VAT relief 
was available for DIY house-builders who had built a new dwelling, but was not 
available for reconstructions. Th e complainant had incorporated an old building 
in a new structure (which would not qualify for the relief) but the Customs and 
Excise offi  ce gave the impression that it might be available and failed to intervene 
when it became apparent that the complainant was under a false impression. Th e 
Department compensated the taxpayer to the tune of  £ 961.67 (representing 
the VAT paid on the building materials) thereby eff ectively arriving at the result 
the taxpayer had hoped, notwithstanding the fact that the taxpayer clearly did 
not come within the scope of the law properly applied. 
 Th e effi  cacy of the Ombudsman in holding HMRC to its advice, whilst help-
ful, also suff ers similar shortcomings to that of the Adjudicator. Its remedies 
are  ‘ soft  ’ as evidenced by  Bradley in that the claimant in that case had to take the 
relevant body to court in order for the body to be bound by the decision of the 
Ombudsman. Secondly, its remit is limited to issues of maladministration which 
cannot be resolved in the court, a limitation which is built into its jurisdiction in 
order, at least in principle, to separate issues of law from administration. 251 
 V. Conclusion 
 For HMRC advice to guide taxpayers as to the legal consequences of their actions, 
it is necessary that there be some mechanism(s) to ensure that HMRC does not 
resile from previous commitments. In the case of individual advice (outside the 
context of binding rulings) or general advice, the taxpayer will have available vari-
ous remedies. However, as this chapter has sought to demonstrate, there are serious 
shortcomings in respect of these in terms of providing protection for taxpayers. 
 Public law provides the most robust protection for taxpayers in the form of the 
doctrine of legitimate expectations. However, this is hampered by problems where 
the advice is incorrect, HMRC ’ s desire to maintain control, issues around clarity, 
the ubiquity of qualifi cations in the advice and restrictions on access to justice. 
Th e extent to which the ECHR and EU law can supplement the common law 
doctrine of legitimate expectations is limited at best. Th at is not to say that the 
doctrine of legitimate expectations fails to fi nd an appropriate balance between 
individual interests and the interests of the general public. It is, rather, that it is 
inapt for the purpose of providing reliability for taxpayers in respect of HMRC 
advice. Private law, meanwhile, is underdeveloped in this area. Finally, the assis-
tance that the Adjudicator and Ombudsman may provide should neither be 
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  252  Williams,  ‘ Th e Multiple Doctrines of Legitimate Expectations ’ (n 33) 651 – 652. 
understated, in that evidence can be produced to demonstrate that both bodies 
can be eff ective in holding HMRC to its advice, nor overstated, in that their remit 
and the enforceability of their recommendations are limited. 
 Th e fact that there are such shortcomings in the protections available to taxpay-
ers is a matter of concern not just from the perspective of the rule of law, but also 
operationally for HMRC. Th e production of advice is warranted on the basis that 
it facilitates collection of tax and hence HMRC performing its primary statutory 
duty. Th e judgment in  Gaines-Cooper , however, suggests that taxpayers should not 
rely on general advice, but rather should approach HMRC directly whenever an 
issue of diffi  culty arises. Th is may require signifi cant correspondence in order to 
ensure that there is absolute agreement of the scope and application of the advice 
provided. Th is in turn will have the eff ect of increasing the costs of collection 
otherwise reduced by the provision of general advice in the fi rst place! 252 
 
